This paper analyses the correlation between employment duration, unemployment duration and general skill accumulation in a search equilibrium. I show how the level of general skills and the duration of employment are positively correlated, and both variables are negatively correlated with the duration of unemployment spells. With search frictions, general skill accumulation is associated with a hold up problem since it benefits future job vacancies which workers expect to be matched with. However, if vacancies direct their search to workers of different skill levels, workers indirectly internalise this externality. I show how Becker's general skill finance rule is modified for a search economy. Extensions analyse the decision of whether to accumulate skills through training or education.
Introduction
This paper analyses the correlation between employment duration, unemployment duration and general skill accumulation in a search equilibrium. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994 ) present a canonical model of endogenous job duration in a search unemployment framework. The extension of that analysis to general skill accumulation constitutes the core of this paper. I show how the level of general skills and the duration of employment are positively correlated, and both variables are negatively correlated with the duration of unemployment spells.
A natural theoretical question which arises in analyzing the correlations above is (i) who finances the acquisition of general skills and (ii) is the level of general skill accumulation efficient? With search frictions both firms and workers have incentives to pay for general skills, since the bilateral surplus is increasing in skill levels. I show how under Nash Bargaining of the bilateral surplus, the Becker (1975) rule for general skill finance (workers pay for all of it) is modified in an intuitive way. Firms pay for their bargaining share of total skill cost minus the appreciation in the workers outside option resulting from skill accumulation. Skill accumulation has two effects, increasing the bilateral surplus and improving the worker's outside option and bargaining power. Since the firm cannot appropriate any share of the improvement in the worker's outside option, the level of the firms's skill finance is exactly its bargaining share of total skill finance less the unappropriable share.
Workers acquire general skills with the first vacancy they are matched with. Since the marginal productivity of workers' general skills is shared with future vacancies who workers expect to be matched with, general skill accumulation is subject to a hold up problem. However, if firms open vacancies which are directed towards workers of different skill levels, workers will indirectly be able to internalize the externality of skill accumulation, through shorter expected unemployment spells.
Besides the hold up problem associated with general skill accumulation, the search employment economy is subject to further well known externalities resulting from (i) job separations causing a negative externality to the pool of existing unemployed workers, and (ii) job creations causing a positive externality on the pool of existing unemployed workers. Hosios (1990) identified a condition under which these latter externalities exactly cancel each other out. I show how given the Hosios condition, with free entry of vacancies, and directed search by vacancies to workers of different skill levels, general skill accumulation is fully efficient. Under these conditions, workers are exactly internalizing the externality generated by general skill accumulation on future vacancies that workers expect to be matched with. Meanwhile, if vacancies do not direct their search to skilled and unskilled workers, the economy is subject to coordination failure. Workers are unable to internalize the externality of their skill accumulation decisions. I discuss conditions under which skill accumulation is distorted in different directions.
Compared to the Becker analysis, the search framework predicts a larger range of skills are accumulated through training than education. I assume skills acquired through education (before entering the labour market) and training (acquired upon being matched with first job) are perfect substitutes in production. Then for Becker, skills whose unit costs are higher under training are accumulated through education and otherwise through training. In my analysis, a range of skills whose costs are higher under training are accumulated through training, since (i) firms participate in the financing of training and (ii) getting the first job takes time so workers discount the benefits of skills acquired through education.
Individual differences in the unit costs of skill accumulation through education give rise to two distinct classes of workers: "white collar" workers who accumulate skills through education and "blue collar" workers who accumulate skills through training. Even small differences in unit costs of skill accumulation can lead to discrete differences in skill levels when one group acquires skills through education and another acquires skills through training. White collar workers who accumulate skills through education have discretely longer employment duration and lower unemployment duration.
Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) provide a comprehensive review of the search unemployment literature. In a full employment framework, general skill accumulation decisions under search frictions and exogenous job destruction have been studied by Acemoglu (1997). Non-directed search by vacancies was assumed in that paper. Acemoglu and Pishcke (1999) argue in an environment of search frictions, firms have an incentive to pay for general skills of workers. My contribution is to analyze the general skill accumulation and finance decision in the context of the Mortensen-Pissarides canonical model of unemployment with endogenous job destruction. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show how the externality generated by firm specific (physical) capital decisions can be indirectly internalized, when workers direct their search towards vacancies of differing capital investment. I show how a similar argument holds in the case of general human capital (skills) decisions. A further contribution of this paper is to compare the decision of acquiring general skills through education or training in the presence of search frictions.
The paper begins by introducing the skill accumulation process through training. The description of equilibrium is followed by efficiency results. The extensions cover an analysis of the economy with non-directed search, education and specific skill accumulation. The last section concludes with suggestions for future research.
Model
There are two types of agents in the economy: entrepreneurs and workers. Everyone is risk neutral and non-wealth constrained. Entrepreneurs open jobs, and their share in the population is fixed. The size of the labor force who are workers is normalized to 1.
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Every entrepreneur has a free supply of jobs they can open. Entrepreneurs and workers are subject to Poisson death shocks at rate δ. A continuous birth of new cohorts of entrepreneurs and workers ensures the size of the population remains constant, and the share of entrepreneurs in the population remains constant. Interest rates are assumed to be zero which implies that the discount rate of the economy is equal to the death rate. The assumption of zero interest rates is used to facilitate the welfare analysis later.
General skills k are embodied in workers and workers can utilize these skills in different matches. Productive matches are bilateral (between one worker and one job), implying the production function is Leontieff. The productivity flow of a particular job-worker match is given by,
] denotes a job specific productivity parameter, and σ is a constant which measures the variability of productivity with respect to this parameter. The skill and job specific components of productivity are additive. 2 The only shocks in the economy are job specific ones, and all jobs have an identical and independent productivity distribution at the point of implementation (when job and worker are first matched). 3 For every newly matched job x =x. The motivation for this assumption is that only the latest and most productive jobs are newly open and matched at any given time. Matched jobs are subject to job specific shocks at Poisson rate λ which give rise to draws of x from a fixed distribution F (x) with E(x) = 0 for each job. When job specific draws yield a productivity below an endogenously determined destruction margin R, the job is destroyed. 4 The productivity of matches is assumed to be non-verifiable by third parties. This assumption is used to separate out the output sharing decision from the skill finance sharing decision.
The general skill accumulation decision of workers is made when an unskilled worker 1 This paper concentrates on the worker side of the economy. The analysis of entrepreneurs is trivial in this economy. 2 This formulation is important for the qualitative results. In some past studies, skill levels were multiplicative to the idisyncratic shock component, but it is unclear why general skill levels should increase the variance of idiosyncratic shocks. 3 The dominace of plant or firm specific idiosyncratic shocks in gross job flows is well documented. See the survey by Davis and Haltiwanger (1998) . 4 Expected employment tenure is then given by
is matched with his first entrepreneur. Skill accumulation is instantaneous. This implies all production occurs with workers who have been skilled. Skill levels are verifiable, and job vacancies can direct their search to workers with particular skill levels k. At any given point in time the distribution of workers with different skill levels, and the distribution of vacancies searching for workers with different skill levels is common knowledge. Search frictions in the matching of workers to vacancies are governed by a constant returns to scale match function with the measure of vacancies and unemployed workers as arguments. For each skill level k, the flow of skilled worker-job matches is given by
is a measure of unemployed workers who are skilled at level k, v(k) the measure of vacancies opened to workers who are skilled at level k.
The flow of unskilled worker-job matches is given byM ≡M(1 − s,v). s denotes the measure of workers who are skilled, so the measure of unskilled workers is 1 −s. Let s(k) denote the measure of workers at skill level k, then s = R k>0 s(k)dk.v is the measure of vacancies opened for unskilled workers.
Let
,θ ≡v (1−s) denote the labor market tightness for skilled and unskilled
are the respective arrival rates of entrepreneurs to skilled and unskilled workers.
≡ q(θ) are the respective arrival rates of skilled and unskilled workers to vacancies opened by entrepreneurs. 5 The elasticity of the arrival rate of workers η ≡ −
> 0 is assumed constant.
I assume that on-the-job search is less intensive than that off the job, and rule out on-the-job search altogether for simplicity. [ Figure 1 ] documents the possible lifetime paths of workers.
The economy differs from the canonical model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , by introducing the continuous birth and death of workers who can acquire general skills through training (within matches). As a result there is a two tier labor market consisting of the unskilled (who have never been matched) and the skilled (who have been matched at least once). In terms of [ Figure 1 ], the lifetime of a worker in the Mortensen and Pissarides economy is summarized by the bottom two boxes of the diagram.
Entrepreneurs
A job open by an entrepreneur can be in one of three states: matched with a skilled worker, searching for a worker of skill k (skilled vacancy), and searching for an unskilled worker (unskilled vacancy). The steady state asset value of a job matched with a skilled 5 The expected unemployment durations for skilled and unskilled workers are given by worker of skill k is,
The flow of expected output to entrepreneurs consists of the product net of wage plus the capital appreciations following productivity shocks minus the capital depreciations following the death of the worker. 6 The outside option of the job once it has been matched is zero since entrepreneurs weakly prefer to open new jobs as opposed to reopening old ones. Assume that old jobs are never re-opened. The asset value of a skilled vacancy searching for a worker of skill k is,
c is the per period cost of recruitment and its level is assumed the same for all skill levels. The asset value of an unskilled vacancy is,
J − γk e is the initial asset value of an idea matched with an unskilled worker, where γ is the unit cost of skill accumulation. k = k e + k w , skill accumulation consists of that financed by entrepreneurs k e , and that financed by workers k w .
Workers
A worker can find himself in three different states: skilled and employed, skilled and unemployed, and unskilled. The asset value of a worker of skill k > 0 matched with a job is,
The asset value of a skilled worker searching for a match is,
a is the income that can be earned outside the employment sector. The asset value of an unskilled worker searching for a match is,
W (k,x) − γk w is the initial asset value of an unskilled worker matched with his first job and first entrepreneur. A maintained assumption to be verified later is that the skilled unemployed a strictly better off than unskilled unemployed U(k) > δÛ ∀k > 0.
Bargaining
Bargaining occurs in the following sequence. A worker matched with his first entrepreneur first bargains over the level of skill acquisition k. Then the pair bargain over the division of skill finance k e and k w . Lastly, after skills are acquired and its cost sunk, the skilled workers and entrepreneurs bargain continuously over the wage w given k and x. Nash Bargaining is adopted throughout, and the bargaining outcomes are analyzed in reverse chronological order.
In a match between a job and a worker skilled to k, the Nash bargaining rule for wages is,
where β is the exogenous bargaining share of a worker. The wage rule is the outcome of continuous bargaining process for the division of output. This continuous bargaining is the unique renegotiation proof rule for dividing output when as assumed, transfers contingent on the level of productivity cannot be enforced. Wages are bargained over given k since the skill investment has already been sunk either in a previous match of the worker or at the beginning of the current match.
denote the bilateral match surplus between a skilled worker and job. The first order condition (FOC) of the wage bargaining rule implies that jobs and skilled workers receive their bargaining share of the match surplus,
Further bargaining considerations are made when an unskilled worker is matched with an idea for the first time. The Nash bargaining rule for skill accumulation and finance is,
denote the bilateral match surplus between an unskilled worker and entrepreneur idea. The FOC fork e implies that ideas and unskilled workers receive their bargaining share of the match surplus,
Due to non-verifiable productivity, the division of output through wages and the division of skill finance become independent problems. Substituting in the wage bargaining rule (8) for x =x, gives us the skill finance rule,
Skill accumulation has two effects, increasing the bilateral surplus and improving the workers outside option and bargaining power. Since the entrepreneur cannot appropriate any share of the improvement in the worker's bargaining power, the level of the entrepreneur's skill finance is exactly his bargaining share of total skill finance less the unappropriable share. This modifies the Becker general skill finance rule for the search employment economy.
The skill accumulation rule is the outcome of Nash bargaining which maximizes the surplus of the match. The skill accumulation rule is,
Skill accumulation is made takingÛ as given since this is a function of skill accumulation outside the current match.
Equilibrium

Skilled Worker Sector
The model is solved as follows. First take the skilled worker endogenous variables: the skill accumulation level k, the job destruction margin R, the vacancy to unemployment ratios for workers of different skill levels θ(k), and the wage rate for workers w. These are solved using the following four rules.
The following equilibrium conditions are derived in the Appendix. 8 For job i, the job destruction equation is,
This says the lowest acceptable productivity of a match plus the option value of retaining the existing match in anticipation of productivity improvements (LHS) equals the opportunity cost of employment (RHS). Differentiating the job destruction equation with respect to k we get,
If the opportunity cost of employment is constant, a higher skill level which increases the productivity of matches implies that the destruction margin must fall. This is for two reasons, (i) the productivity within the current match is higher than elsewhere (second term of LHS), and (ii) the option value of retaining the current match is higher (third term of LHS). The opportunity cost of employment does respond positively to the skill level since as in the current match, skills reduce the destruction margin of future matches and improve the rematch probabilities of workers. Since both these effects are conditional on skills lowering the destruction margin of the current match, overall the destruction margin must respond negatively to skill levels. From the job destruction rule S(k, x)−S(k, R) = S(k, x), the bilateral surplus created by a match between an idea and a skilled worker can be rewritten as a direct function 8 The derivation of the job creation, job destruction and wage equations is similar to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) of the destruction margin only,
. This means if
< 0: the destruction margin responds negatively to skill levels if and only if the match surplus between an entrepreneurial idea and skilled worker increases in skill levels.
The job creation equation is,
Entrepreneurs receive fixed shares of the bilateral surplus. Increases in the surplus which occur through reductions in the destruction margin, will invite entry into the competitive vacancy market and increase θ(k).
Differentiating the job creation equation with respect to k one gets,
Since entrepreneurs appropriate a share of the match surplus, higher skill levels will invite entry of vacancies into the market for skilled workers and increase the tightness of the market for skilled workers. The comparative statics imply Figure 2 ] shows the job destruction and job creation curves for a given skill level k plotted in the space of {θ, R} , and how these curves shift with an increase in skill to k 0 .
The skill accumulation equation is,
The marginal productivity of skills in improving the option value of retaining existing matches is decreasing in the destruction margin. This implies that the marginal productivity of skills in improving the match surplus is decreasing in the destruction margin. The m(θ) β η term in the numerator captures the fact that when unemployment durations are shorter the marginal productivity of general skills is higher during the worker's lifetime. The same term in the denominator captures the fact that shorter unemployment durations reduce the expected duration of any match. The skill accumulation rule internalizes the effect that skill levels have on the labour market tightness θ(k), faced by the worker. This is the result of vacancies exercising directed search to workers of different skill levels.
Proposition 1 Average unemployment duration is decreasing and job tenure increasing in the level of general skills. General skills are decreasing in unemployment duration and increasing in job tenure.
Comparative statics thus reveal a feedback effect between the skill level and labor market variables. Skill levels are positively correlated with the match durations and negatively correlated to unemployment durations of skilled workers. The higher job turnover rate (implied by a higher destruction margin) in countries with lower skill accumulation has been documented by several studies. The longer duration of unemployment for formal sector skilled and unskilled workers in poorer countries provides an explanation for their lower formal sector labour force participation rates.
The wage equation is,
Wages consist of the opportunity cost of employment plus the workers' share of the flow surplus from the match. Wages are increasing in θ(k) which is increasing in the skill level, reflecting that as skills become less de facto specific, wages approach the marginal product of the match 9 .
Unskilled Worker Sector
The remaining endogenous variables, the vacancy to unemployment ratio for unskilled workersθ, and the entrepreneur share of general skill finance k e , are solved by backwards induction using the solutions from the skilled worker sector and the following two rules, (i) Skill finance rule γk *
The second rule says the value of a vacancy searching for workers of the equilibrium skill level, is equivalent to that searching for unskilled workers.
The job creation condition for unskilled workers is,
Increases in the vacancy to unemployment ratio for unskilled workers reflect increases in the initial surplus of a match between an idea and an unskilled worker. Both the solved asset equation for unskilled workers and unemployed skilled workers are linear in their respective labor market tightness measures. The difference in these asset values is given by,
Substituting this into the Skill Finance Rule yields the equilibrium level of entrepreneur skill finance. The earlier claim that U (k) >Û ∀k > 0 can now be verified. The skill finance rule and no skill arbitrage rule imply,
Combining the last two equations, for all k > 0 we must have θ(k) >θ ⇒ U (k) >Û, k e > 0. The expected unemployment duration for skilled workers is shorter. Unemployed skilled workers never prefer to behave like an unskilled worker. The entrepreneur share of skill finance is never negative.
Unemployment
The flow out of skilled workers is given by δs. The flow into skilled workers is given by m(θ)(1 − s). Equating these two flows and rearranging, the steady state share of skilled workers is,
This is a positive function of the vacancy to unemployment ratio for unskilled workers. The flow out of skilled unemployment u s is m(θ(k)) + δu s . The flow into skilled unemployment is (s − u s ) [δ + λF (R)] . Equating these two flows and rearranging, the steady state share of skilled unemployed workers is,
s u s is a positive function of the vacancy to unemployment ratio for skilled workers θ(k), and a negative function of the job destruction margin R. The share of workers who are unemployed is given by one minus the share of workers who are employed,
Higher equilibrium skill levels are associated with lower R, and higher {θ(k),θ}. Skill levels are thus correlated with a larger share of the workforce who are skilled and a larger share of the skilled who are employed.
Efficiency
This section highlights how workers indirectly internalize the positive externality that their skill accumulation decisions have on future entrepreneurs they expect to be matched with. Given θ(k), workers's skill accumulation generates a positive externality on the share of the match surplus (1−β)S, enjoyed by future entrepreneurs who workers expect to be matched with. The marginal externality of skill accumulation is given by,
is the flow of marginal externalities to future entrepreneurs which arrive at rate m(θ(k)), and this is normalized by the discount rate of the economy to yield a stock measure.
If vacancies undertake directed search to workers of different skill levels, workers internalize the effect that skill accumulation has on their outside option through improved matching prospects m(θ(k)). The flow of marginal product of skills through improved match prospects is given by m 0 (θ(k))
βS. Using (18), and the definition of the elasticity of the arrival rate of workers η, the flow of this marginal product can be rewritten as
. The stock of marginal productivity through improved job prospects is then given by,
∂S(k) ∂k
Under the Hosios condition η = β, the externality of skill accumulation is exactly internalized through improved match prospects. The free entry of vacancies and directed search by vacancies, together with the Hosios condition ensure general skill accumulation is efficient. By inspection, when η > β, there will be under-investment in skills, and when η < β there will be over-investment in skills. More generally one can define the social planner's problem and show how under the assumed conditions, the outcomes under a competitive equilibrium coincide exactly with those of the social planner. The social planner's problem is given by, (27) max
subject to the constraints,
The social planner maximizes the discounted flow of net income streams. b denotes the measure of workers who are in matches where idea specific productivity is not at the supremum, x 6 =x. The three constraints describe the evolution over time of skilled workers, matches and matches where productivity is not at the supremum respectively. Proposition 2 Given the Hosios Condition for no search externalities, the free entry of vacancies and directed search by vacancies, the solution to the social planner's problem is identical to outcomes under the competitive equilibrium. If η > β, there is underinvestment in skills, if η < β there is over-investment in skills.
Proof in Appendix. Assuming the discount rate is equal to the death rate of the economy simplifies the welfare analysis by allowing us to directly compare steady state solutions of the social planning and real economy rather than having to determine the discounted value of the change in some variable along a convergent path from one solution to the other. Otherwise the assumption that the interest rate is zero is inessential.
Acemoglu (1997) identifies a hold up problem which arises from workers being unable to directly internalize the benefits that their skill accumulation has on future entrepreneurs they expect to be matched with. This is because the identity of the future entrepreneurs or vacancies is unknown and contracts cannot specify parties to the contract.
Here, this underinvestment is mitigated since workers are able to indirectly internalize this externality through higher expected match rates given the free entry condition: competition solves the hold up problem. Acemoglu and Shimer (1998) have discussed a similar mechanism for the case of entrepreneurs making match specific ex ante physical investments before opening vacancies.
Extensions
Equilibrium with Non-directed Search
When the same type of vacancy is opened for workers of every skill level we have nondirected search. By construction then, θ ≡θ ≡ v 1−s+u s . The asset equation for vacancies becomes,
The expected capital gain through matches is a weighted average of the gains through being matched with a skilled worker and being matched with an unskilled worker. The skill accumulation rule is modified to,
Under non-directed search, the tightness of the market becomes an aggregate variable, changes of which are not internalized by individual worker-entrepreneur matches. The new skill accumulation equation,
reflects the underinvestment which results from this externality. Qualitatively, the feedback between k and {R, θ} is unchanged, but some of the feedback between k and θ is not captured.
The externality that workers cannot internalize consists of the effect of skill levels on future re-match probabilities. This has a positive and negative feedback effect. Higher rematch probability implies workers should invest more (this is represented by the second term on the numerator), but the same effect implies that workers exaggerate the effect of skills on lowering the destruction margin such that workers should invest less (this is represented by the third term in brackets on the denominator). Overall there is underinvestment by workers, and the positive feedback implies the existence of coordination failure.
Proposition 3 In an economy where vacancies cannot direct their search to workers of different general skill levels, there is underinvestment in general skills.
Education
In the classic Becker (1975) analysis, the decision to acquire skills through training or education follows a simple rule. For skills where the marginal cost is lower in training, acquire them on the job, and otherwise acquire them through education.
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The education decision is set to solve,
Where α ∈ (0, 1] denotes the relative cheapness of education. For Becker, workers would accumulate all these skills through education. The education decision is solved by backward induction given the solutions from the unskilled sector, which in turn are solved by backward induction given the solutions from the skilled sector. Define the level of training t ≡ k − h ≥ 0. The modified job creation condition for unskilled workers is,
When the level of education exceeds the optimizing training level h ≥ k * , there is no longer a distinction between skilled and unskilled workers in the search market, i.e. θ = θ,Û = U. Substituting in for equilibriumÛ, U this condition maps a continuous monotonic increasing relationship between equilibriumθ and h. The marginal benefit of education is given by,
< γ for ∀θ < ∞. So when α = 1, workers strictly prefer to accumulate skills through training, and buy no education; h * = 0 the corner solution. Due to discounting and the sharing of skill finance, training is superior to education. Education has some marginal benefit in improving the match probabilities of workers virgin to the labor market but, this benefit is strictly dominated in the case of equal unit costs of training and education. There exists a critical α * < 1 defined by,
If α ≥ α * workers prefer to accumulate these skills through training, and otherwise they prefer to accumulate skills through education. So compared to the Becker analysis, the set of skills accumulated through training is larger in a labor market characterized by search frictions. If h < k * , sinceθ is monotonically increasing in h, the marginal benefit of education is increasing in the level of education. If h ≥ k * , this process slows down and eventually the marginal benefit is falling in education, although it remains positive. Given that the marginal cost of education is constant, these statements imply that h * > k * h given α < α * .
When education is optimally purchased for a particular skill, it is never 'topped-up' by training following the first job match.
[ Figure 3 ] plots the marginal benefit function of education h.The critical α * < 1 below which workers acquire skills through education ensures the total benefit of acquiring skills through education (area B) offsets the total cost of acquiring skills through education (area A).
There is a discrete gap between the skill levels of agents who acquire skills through education versus training. Agents with α ≥ α * acquire skills through training at k * .
Agents with α ≥ α * acquire skills through education of at least h(a
Overall, the analysis of education in a search economy highlights the 'backwards induction' feature of education incentives. The decision to educate or train is subtle: the incentives to buy education are derived from the employment opportunities available in the job market and the degree to which the unit costs of education are cheaper than that of training.
White versus Blue Collar Workers
The analysis on education suggests sharp predictions about the formation of distinct classes of workers in the economy. Workers with different unit costs of skills may exhibit qualitatively different patterns of skill accumulation. The cut off margin for relative costs of education will be higher for workers with lower unit costs of skill accumulation, α * L > α * H given γ L < γ H . If important skills are characterized by relative costs of educationα, and α * L >α ≥ α * H , workers with the higher unit costs (blue collar workers) buy no education and become skilled only once matches with entrepreneurs are realized. Blue collar workers train within matches to skill level k * , whereas workers with low unit costs (white collar workers) accumulate all their skills through education, to a level h * > k * (strictly higher skill levels). White collar workers will have longer average tenure, lower unemployment duration and higher specific skill accumulation.
Specific Skill Accumulation
The productivity flow of a particular entrepreneur-worker match, is now a function of idea specific skills z,
It is also convenient to allow agents to live forever by getting rid of death shocks, so the death rate should now be interpreted as the interest rate. For vacancies, all searching workers are now identical, so the issue of whether search is directed or not is irrelevant.
The asset value of a matched idea i, after specific skill investments have been sunk is given by,
The asset value of an idea searching for a worker is given by,
The asset value of a worker matched with an idea, after specific skill investment has been sunk is given by,
The asset value of a worker searching for a job is given by,
11 Again we assume that specific skill levels do not increase the variance of idiosyncratic shocks.
Where z ≡ z e + z w .
Again productivity contingent transfers are ruled out and wages are set to maximize the Nash Product for Wages once the specific investment is sunk,
Specific Skill Accumulation and Finance are determined by maximizing the Nash Product,
The FOCs yield the Specific Skill Accumulation Rule and Skill Finance Rule,
Unlike general skills, specific skills do not improve the outside option of workers so entrepreneurs simply pay their bargaining share of the costs of specific skill accumulation. From the FOC for the Skill Accumulation Rule we get the Specific Skill Accumulation Equation,
Intuitively, the incentives for specific skill accumulation are independent of the matching possibilities within the economy and only a function of the expected duration of the current match.
From the Job Destruction Rule the Job Destruction Equation is,
Unlike general skills, idea specific skills have no effect on the vacancy to unemployment ratio and no effect on the destruction margin of future matches of the worker. This implies that,
From the Free Entry Rule the Job Creation Equation is given by,
Taking differentials with respect to z,
In the economy where specific skill accumulation is undertaken, the equilibrium specific skill level maximizes the tightness of the market. Combining these results with the analysis for general skill accumulation, general and specific skill are indirect complements. Higher general skills complement specific skills through a lower destruction margin. Optimally determined specific skills complement general skills through a lower destruction margin and higher labor market tightness.
Conclusion
This paper identified the feedback linkages between general skills and labor market variables. The modified Becker rule for general skill accumulation in a search economy together with the conditions for efficient skill accumulation provide analytical benchmarks for future research in this area. The endogenous determination of skill accumulation through training or education provides insights into the relationship between education and per capita income levels.
The propagation mechanisms developed here are confined to the worker side of the economy. The perfectly elastic supply of vacancies assumed in the paper needs to be modified in an integrated story of worker and entrepreneurial dynamics. The fact that efficient skill accumulation is conditional on free entry of vacancies suggests that the efficiency implications of entrepreneurial dynamics will not be straightforward.
A natural extension of this work is to apply it to issues of youth unemployment and training, and long term unemployment and training. This could be accommodated by adopting a life-cycle version of the perpetual youth over-lapping generations model, as explored by Gertler (1999) . Workers could be in two states young and old where the young face a constant transition probability to become old and the old face a constant probability of death. The model should predict that the longest unemployment durations are suffered by the old unskilled, the shortest by the young skilled, although as a group there is more unemployment among the young then among the old.
A further application of this framework is to consider the importance of the first job for young labor market entrants. Recall the quality of the first job of workers will determine initial levels of general training and thus future job prospects. When ex ante identical young workers within a cohort are matched with first jobs of different quality, it is likely to create substantial within-cohort earnings inequality which persists throughout the careers of the cohort members. Meanwhile, were one to compare between cohorts who entered the labor market at different times, the performance of the aggregate economy at the time of labor market entry is likely to have a persistent effect on the earnings outcomes of different cohort members' careers.
Appendix
Skilled Sector Equilibrium
The per period income flow to an entrepreneur is,
The per period surplus income flow to a matched skilled worker is,
Summing we get,
After substituting in, the match surplus can be expressed as,
Setting x = R and S(R) ≡ 0 we get the job destruction rule. The free entry condition implies a positive correlation between the size of the asset value from a newly matched idea and the vacancy to unemployment ratio for skilled workers,
Combining this with the surplus division rule, we get the job creation equation.
From the function for the bilateral surplus and the wage bargaining rule, the asset value from being unemployed can be rewritten as, δU = a + m(θ)β σ(x − R) 2δ + λ
The joint asset value of a new idea matched with an unskilled worker is,
The FOC for the Skill Accumulation Rule is initially given by,
The marginal productivity and marginal cost of skills are equated. The first term in the LHS captures the effect that skill levels have on the workers individual rematch probability (conditional on directed search) and the second term captures the effect that skill levels have on improving the size of current and future expected match surpluses. Substituting in the equilibrium equations for 
Efficiency
The current value Hamiltonian of the social planner's problem is given by, 
The equivalence of this with the Job Creation Equation for unskilled workers implies that decentralized entry of vacancies for unskilled workers is efficient.
The equivalence of this with the flow value of unskilled workers implies that births into the unskilled worker pool are efficient. − γk. These imply that the economy is fully efficient subject to search frictions as long as there are no search externalities.
Education
As long as h ≤ k, the asset value of an unemployed workers with education h can be written as, 
